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1 INTRODUCTION
‘Reasonableness and fairness’ can undoubtedly be reckoned among the ‘core
concepts’ of the Dutch Civil Code (hereafter: ‘DCC’). The important role this
concept plays within the law of obligations is made clear by art. 6:2 and art.
6:248 DCC.1 Next to these more general provisions, the Dutch Civil Code
contains several specific applications of the concept.2 One of the provisions
in which the concept of reasonableness and fairness is applied is art. 7:904
par. 1 DCC. This specific application forms the central theme of this contribu-
tion.
Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC is part of the title on the contract of settlement. A
species of the contract of settlement is the contract of binding advice. Binding
advice is amethod of Alternative Dispute Resolution (hereafter: ‘ADR’) inwhich
an independent third party (one or more ‘binding advisor(s)’) gives a binding
decision that resolves the dispute between the parties.3 Especially in consumer
disputes, this method of alternative dispute resolution is used very often. The
Netherlands has a successful system of consumer dispute resolution through
binding advice by e.g. ConsumerComplaints Boards (‘Geschillencommissies’).4
Binding advice resembles arbitration to some extent, but it differs from it in
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1 See also the contribution of Cartwright to this yearbook.
2 Cartwright gives an overview; see footnote 13 of his contribution.
3 Binding advice can also be used in situations where there is no legal dispute between the
parties, butwhere the third party supplements ormodifies the rules governing the juridical
relationship between the parties; P.E. Ernste, Bindend advies (diss. Nijmegen), Deventer:
Kluwer 2012, p. 1; B. van der Bend, M. Leijten & M. Ynzonides (eds.), A guide to the NAI
Arbitration Rules, Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2009, p. 46.
4 See on the Dutch consumer dispute resolution system further section 2.
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that its procedure is much less regulated and a grant of execution (‘exequatur’)
for the decision cannot be obtained. Since binding advice is based on a contract,
the decision has the force of an agreement between the parties. A party can
request performance before a court.5 Although its name is somewhat am-
biguous, binding advice is thus a binding form of ADR. From art. 7:902 DCC
it follows that a decision taken to terminate an uncertainty or dispute in the
field of the law of property, proprietary rights and interests is valid, notwith-
standing that it proves to be in breach of mandatory law, unless it would also
be in breach of good morals and public policy. The DCC holds very limited
grounds on which a decision taken by binding advisors can be challenged.
Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC states:
‘A decision of a party or third person may be annulled if it would be unacceptable
to hold him6 to it in connection with the content or manner of its establishment
in the given circumstances, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.’
Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC introduces a marginal review of the decisions of binding
advisors. Only if it is unacceptable to hold a party to it according to standards
of reasonableness and fairness, may the decision be annulled.7 The case law
makes it clear that this can only be assumed in exceptional circumstances.8
However, it is questionable whether this limited possibility of review can
be maintained with the implementation of Directive 2013/11/EU on consumer
ADR (hereafter: ADR Directive) in tandem with Regulation (EU) 524/2013 on
consumer ODR (hereafter: ODR Regulation; ODR stands for ‘Online Dispute
Resolution’).9 Directive 2013/11/EU aims to facilitate access for consumers
to ADR procedures and establishes several quality requirements for ADR Proced-
5 Binding advice is a typical Dutch legal construct. For foreign structures that are to some
extent comparable, see Ernste 2012, pp. 11-12. See on the construct of binding advice further
section 2.
6 This translation of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC suggests that it is the party or the third person
who has taken the decision that may annul the decision. Obviously, it is the parties that
are bound by the decision that have this authority. ‘Him’ refers to the parties that have
brought their dispute to ADR, not to the binding advisor who has decided their case.
7 Toelichting Meijers, Vierde gedeelte, Boek 7, pp. 1146-1147; C. Hodges, I. Benöhr & N.
Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in Europe, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2012, p. 142; Ernste
2012, p. 73; Dutch Supreme Court 15 June 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW0727 (PWC/x), par.
3.5.2.
8 Dutch Suptreme Court18 June 1993, NJ 1993/615 (Gruythuysen c.s./SCZ), par. 4; Dutch
Supreme Court 25 March 1994, NJ 1995/23 (Midden Gelderland/Lukkien), par. 3.3; Dutch
Supreme Court 12 September 1997, NJ 1998/382, note M.M. Mendel (Confood/Zürich), par.
3.5; see also Ernste 2012, p. 73; Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 163.
9 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on
alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC; Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer
disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC.
Knigge & Verhage 63
ures.10 Member states need to ensure that disputes covered by the Directive
can be submitted to an ADR entity which complies with these requirements.11
The aim of the ODR Regulation is to create an online ADR platform, which
should increase access for consumers and traders online to ADR procedures
and make the online resolution of consumer disputes possible.12
This contribution examines the impact of the ADR Directive on the inter-
pretation of the concept of reasonableness and fairness within the context of
art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. If a binding advice procedure does not comply with the
quality requirements set out in the Directive, will this make it ‘unacceptable
according to standards of reasonableness and fairness’ to hold a party to the
decision? Does the ADR Directive require that the decision can be annulled
in such a case? These questionswill be addressed in this contribution (sections
6-7), after a further analysis of the Dutch system of resolving consumer dis-
putes by means of binding advice is given (section 2) and the aims of the ADR
Directive (section 3), its quality requirements (section 4) and the implementa-
tion in the Dutch legal system (section 5) are described. This contribution closes
with suggestions for alternative ways to enhance the quality of consumer ADR
(section 8).
2 RESOLVING CONSUMER DISPUTES THROUGH BINDING ADVICE IN THE
NETHERLANDS
In the Netherlands, alternative resolution of consumer disputes is well devel-
oped. Different institutions that provide out-of-court resolution for consumer
disputes co-exist. Characteristic of the Dutch Consumer Dispute Resolution
system (hereafter: ‘Dutch CDR system’) is the triad of the Foundation for the
Consumer Complaints Boards (the ‘Stichting Geschillencommissies voor
Consumentenzaken’, hereafter: ‘SGC’), the Financial Services Complaints
Tribunal (‘Klachteninstituut Financiële Dienstverlening’, hereafter: ‘Kifid’) and
the Health Insurance Complaints and Disputes Board (‘Stichting Klachten en
Geschillen Zorgverzekeringen’, hereafter: ‘SKGZ’). The SGC, Kifid and SKGZ use
a variety of ADR procedures that range from an ombudsman scheme to medi-
ation. However, central part of the dispute resolution scheme of almost all
of these institutions is a binding advice procedure.13
Binding advice is an informal method of ADR. Binding advice is based on
a contract between the parties. This contract is seen as a species of the contract
10 See for example recital 7 of the ADR Directive.
11 See art. 5 ADR Directive.
12 See art. 1 ODR Regulation; recital 18 ODR Regulation.
13 See on the Dutch CDR system Hodges, Benöhr & Creutzfeldt-Banda 2012, pp. 129-165. By
way of exception, arbitration is used instead of binding advice. This is the case at the
Geschillencommissie Garantiewoningen.
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of settlement (‘vaststellingsovereenkomst’), governed by title 15 of book 7 of
the Dutch Civil Code. By this contract, parties agree in advance to be bound
by the decision given by one or more binding advisors. An important differ-
ence with arbitration is that the decision taken by binding advisors cannot
acquire the force of res judicata and a grant of execution (‘exequatur’) cannot
be obtained. However, the decision does have the force of an agreement
between the parties. Non-compliance is seen as breach of contract and a party
can request performance before a court.14 In practice, enforcement is not
problematic for the consumer when binding advice at the SGC is concerned.
The Consumer Complaints Boards under the umbrella of the SGC are estab-
lished after negotiations between trade associations and consumer asso-
ciation(s). The trade association guarantees payment of the claim if the trader
fails to do so.15
There are limited grounds on which the validity of a decision taken by
binding advisors can be challenged. A decision may be annulled on the basis
of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC if it would be unacceptable to hold a party to it accord-
ing to standards of reasonableness and fairness. Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCCmentions
two grounds for review. It may be unacceptable to hold a party to a decision
either in connection with the content of the decision or in connection with the
manner of its establishment. Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC also makes it clear that the
given circumstances should be taken into account while making the assessment.
When is it unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and
fairness to hold a party to a decision in connection with the content of this
decision? Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC should be read in conjunction with art. 7:902
DCC. This provision makes it clear that a decision is binding on the parties
even if it is in breach of mandatory law. This is different when the decision
is also in breach of good morals and public policy:
‘A settlement to terminate an uncertainty or dispute in the field of the law of
property, proprietary rights and interests is valid, notwithstanding that it proves
to be in breach of mandatory law, unless it would also, as to content or necessary
implication, be in breach of good morals and public policy.’
Art. 7:902 DCC has implications for art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. Since art. 7:902 DCC
makes it clear that a decision is even valid if it is in breach of mandatory law,
it is not possible to annul a decision on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC on
14 See for English legal literature on binding advice Van der Bend, Leijten & Ynzonides 2009,
pp. 46-47; J.M.J. Chorus, P.H.M. Gerver & E.H. Hondius (eds.), Introduction to Dutch law,
Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2006, pp. 239-240, p. 268; M. van Hooijdonk
& P. Eijsvoogel, Litigation in the Netherlands. Civil Procedure, Arbitration and Administrative
Litigation, Den Haag: Kluwer Law International 2012, pp. 149-150.
15 Hodges, Benöhr & Creutzfeldt-Banda 2012, p. 140, p. 144; Chorus, Gerver &Hondius 2006,
pp. 240, 268.
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the sole ground that it is in breach of mandatory law.16 An error in the de-
cision is not enough to challenge the decision.17 Only serious defects in the
decision will justify the conclusion that it is unacceptable to hold a party to
it.18
Art. 7:902 DCC in combination with art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC thus makes it
possible for the SGC to apply a different standard for deciding their cases than
the rules of law. Instead, they decide the disputes submitted to them according
to ‘reasonableness and fairness, while taking into account the contract between
the parties and the conditions included therein’.19 These conditions are usually
the conditions bilaterally agreed between trade associations and consumer
association(s).20 Research shows that these conditions play a role in a sub-
stantial number of decisions of the SGC.21 The decisions by the SGC are there-
fore not necessarily in accordance with (mandatory) law.22 Art. 7:902 DCC
approves this possible deviation from the law, as long as goodmorals or public
policy are not breached.
A decision may also be annulled on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC in
connection with the manner of its establishment. Themanner of establishment
of a decision may for example be contested when the principles of a fair trial
have not been observed. However, the case law of the Dutch Supreme Court
makes it clear that the principles of a fair trial are not applicable in full in
every binding advice procedure. Binding advice can also be used in situations
where there is no legal dispute between the parties, but where binding advisors
supplement or modify the rules governing the juridical relationship between
the parties.23 For example, in case of a leasehold the parties may agree not
to determine the amount of the ground rent payable by the leaseholder in the
16 Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 163; see Dutch Supreme Court 12 September 1997,
NJ 1998/382, note M.M. Mendel (Confood/Zürich) and the opinion of Advocate General
Bakels, no 3.26-3.29.
17 Dutch Supreme Court 18 June 1993, NJ 1993/615 (Gruythuysen c.s./SCZ), par. 4; Dutch
Supreme Court 25 March 1994, NJ 1995/23 (Midden Gelderland/Lukkien), par. 3.3; Dutch
Supreme Court 12 September 1997, NJ 1998/382, note M.M. Mendel (Confood/Zürich), par.
3.5.
18 Dutch Supreme Court 12 September 1997,NJ 1998/382, noteM.M.Mendel (Confood/Zürich),
par. 3.5; Dutch SupremeCourt 15 June 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW0727 (PWC/x), par. 3.5.2.
19 See for example the rules of procedure of the Geschillencommissie Afbouw, art. 16.1;
Geschillencommissie Reizen, art. 15.1. See also Ernste 2012, pp. 61-63.
20 See on the process of negotiating conditions and establishing aConsumerComplaints Board
Hodges, Benöhr & Creutzfeldt-Banda 2012, pp. 137-139.
21 J.M.P. Verstappen, W.H. van Boom, M.B.M. Loos & J.G.J. Rinkes, Onderzoek naar de rol van
algemene voorwaarden in de praktijk van de geschillencommissies SGC, Ministerie van Economi-
sche Zaken 2007, in particular pp. 4, 16.
22 See alsoM.B.M. Loos, ‘Verboden exoneraties in energieleveringsovereenkomsten en vernieti-
ging van met de wet strijdige bindende adviezen’, Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht en
handelspraktijken 2006, pp. 3-6, in particular pp. 3-4.
23 See also footnote 3.
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contract itself, but to leave the determination to binding advisors.24 In such
a case, laxer standards apply. By contrast, if the binding advice procedure
comes closer to a judicial procedure, the principles of a fair trial become more
important.25 This contribution focuses on binding advice procedures in which
consumer disputes are being resolved. Since these procedures resemble judicial
procedures, the principles of a fair trial will play a more important role.
However, even if the judge establishes that one of the principles of a fair trial
was breached in a binding advice procedure, this will not necessarily mean
that the decision may be annulled. The Supreme Court has held that if a
procedural fault has been made in the establishment of a decision, one of the
factors that should be considered in assessing whether the decision should
be set aside is whether, and if so, to what extent, the procedural fault has
disadvantaged the other party .26 There are cases in which the principle of
audi alteram partem was breached during the binding advice procedure, but
where annulment was rejected on the basis of this ‘disadvantage criterion’.27
The standard set by art. 7:904 par 1 DCC for the annulment of decisions
given by binding advisors is thus very strict. Annulment is only possible if
it is unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness for a
party to be held to the decision. There are good reasons for this strictness.With
regard to arbitration procedures, the Dutch Supreme Court considers that an
annulment procedure may not be used as a de facto appeal of the decision by
arbitrators. The general interest of an effectively functioning arbitral procedure
entails that the civil courts should only intervene in arbitral decisions in
striking cases.28 Similar reasons apply when binding advice procedures are
concerned. Parties turn to binding advice to put an end to their conflict. This
aim cannot be achieved if the decision taken by binding advisors can be
challenged too easily. However, the question is whether this strict standard
can still be maintained with the implementation of the ADR Directive in the
Dutch judicial system.
24 This was for example the case in Dutch Supreme Court 20 May 2005, NJ 2007/114, note
H.J. Snijders under NJ 2007/115 (Gem. Amsterdam/Honnebier).
25 For example, the Dutch Supreme Court has considered that a decision should be better
motivated as the binding advice procedure is more in the nature of a judicial procedure.
See Dutch Supreme Court 20May 2005,NJ 2007/114, note H.J. Snijders underNJ 2007/115
(Gem. Amsterdam/Honnebier), par. 3.4; Dutch Supreme Court 24 March 2006, NJ 2007/115,
note H.J. Snijders (Meurs/Newomij), par. 3.4.2.
26 Dutch Supreme Court 20 May 2005, NJ 2007/114, note H.J. Snijders under NJ 2007/115
(Gem. Amsterdam/Honnebier), par. 3.3; Dutch Supreme Court 24 March 2006, NJ 2007/115,
note H.J. Snijders (Meurs/Newomij), par. 3.4.4; Dutch Supreme Court 1 July 1988, NJ 1988/
1034 (Delta Lloyd/N.), par. 3.2.
27 Dutch Supreme Court 24 March 2006, NJ 2007/115, note H.J. Snijders (Meurs/Newomij),
par. 3.4.4; Dutch Supreme Court 1 July 1988, NJ 1988/1034 (Delta Lloyd/N.), par. 3.2.
28 Dutch Supreme Court 17 January 2003, NJ 2004/384, note HJS (IMS/Modsaf c.s. I), par. 3.3;
Dutch Supreme Court 9 January 2004,NJ 2005/190, note HJS (Nannini/SFT), par. 3.5.2; Dutch
Supreme Court 24 April 2009,NJ 2010/171, note H.J. Snijders (IMS/Modsaf c.s. II), par. 4.3.1.
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3 THE ADR DIRECTIVE AND ODR REGULATION: AN INTRODUCTION
On 21May 2013 the European legislator passed the ADR Directive and the ODR
Regulation; both published in the Official Journal of the EU on 18 June 2013.
The ADR Directive and ODR Regulation, two interlinked and complementary
legislative instruments, promote and facilitate the simple, fast and digital (out-
of-court) resolution of consumer disputes.29
The ADR Directive aims to assure that consumers can submit complaints
against traders to ADR entities offering independent, impartial, transparent,
effective, fast and fair alternative dispute resolution procedures.30 The ODR
Regulation on the other hand establishes an ODR platform at Union level in
the form of an interactivewebsite, offering a single point of entry to consumers
and traders seeking to resolve their dispute out of court.31 The Regulation
and the Directive are complementary in the sense that the EU framework of
ADR entities and ADR procedures covered by the ADR Directive32 will be linked
to the ODR platform.33 The availability of ADR entities and procedures across
Europe qualified according to the ADRDirective is a precondition for the proper
functioning of the ODR platform.34 The ADR Directive should have been imple-
mented in the Member States no later than 9 July 2015.35 The ODR Regulation
has gone into effect on 15 February 2016.36
Asmentioned the ADRDirective aims to assure that consumers can submit
complaints against traders to ADR entities offering ADR-procedures.37 To qual-
ify as an ADR entity under the Directive, an entity (regardless of its name or
how it is referred to) should be established on a durable basis and offer dispute
resolution by means of an ADR procedure.38 Currently the ADR procedures
and in a wider sense the ADR systems still differ a lot across the Union. How-
ever, the ADR Directive allows such diversity (even post-implementation) as
it states that on a Member States level different forms of ADR procedures to
resolve consumer disputes co-exist or that a combination of two or more ADR
procedures are being used.39 The ADRDirective builds on existing ADR proced-
29 Recital 12, 15 ADR Directive.
30 Art. 1 ADR Directive.
31 Recital 18 ODR Regulation.
32 Which means that the ADR entity and the ADR procedure both comply with the (quality)
requirements set out in the ADR Directive (recital 24 ADR Directive).
33 Recital 12 ADR Directive.
34 Recital 12 ADR Directive.
35 Art. 25 ADR Directive.
36 Art. 22 ODR Regulation, with the exceptions specified therein.
37 Art. 1 ADR Directive.
38 Art. 4 par. 1 sub (h) ADR Directive. The entity that qualifies as an ADR entity under the
Directive shall be listed in accordance with art. 20 par. 2 ADR Directive.
39 Recital 21 ADR Directive.
68 3 – The impact of the ADR Directive on article 7:904 par. 1 DCC explored
ures in the Member States and respects their legal traditions.40 The Directive
therefore has a spacious scope, which also follows from art. 2 par. 1 ADR
Directive:
‘This Directive shall apply to procedures for the out-of-court resolution of domestic
and cross-border disputes concerning contractual obligations stemming from sales
contracts or service contracts between a trader established in the Union and a
consumer resident in the Union through the intervention of an ADR entity which
proposes or imposes a solution or brings the parties together with the aim of
facilitating an amicable solution.’
Hence the Directive is without prejudice to the form that ADR procedures take
within theMember States and applies horizontally to all types of ADR proced-
ures.41 However, the scope of the ADR Directive is restricted by par. 2 of art. 2.
The ADR Directive is most notably not applicable to procedures initiated by
a trader against a consumer.42 Dutch binding advice imposes a solution on
the parties (sections 1 and 2) and, as the Dutch implementation legislation
proves to be true, binding advice falls within the scope of ADR procedures
covered by the ADR Directive.43 Therefore, binding advice (as the ADR proced-
ure chosen by the ADR entity under the scope of the ADR Directive) should
comply with different requirements, i.e. access to and quality of ADR entities
and ADR procedures, information and cooperation on national and EU level
and enforcement.44
As this contribution addresses the question whether the breach of the quality
requirements put forward in the ADRDirectivemakes it ‘unacceptable accord-
ing to standards of reasonableness and fairness’ to hold a party to the decision
taken by binding advisors, the next section will highlight the various quality
requirements set out in the ADR Directive and, where applicable, of the ODR
Regulation.
40 Recital 15 and 24 ADR Directive. This means that if no ADR procedure is yet available
in a Member State this Member State is free to choose the form of the ADR procedure
preferred to comply with the ADR Directive.
41 Recitals 19 and 21 ADR Directive.
42 Art. 2 par. 2 ADR Directive.
43 Wet van 16 april 2015 tot implementatie van de Richtlijn 2013/11/EU van het Europees
Parlement en de Raad van 21mei 2013 betreffende alternatieve beslechting van consumen-
tengeschillen en tot wijziging van Verordening (EG) nr. 2006/2004 en Richtlijn 2009/22/EG
en uitvoering van de Verordening (EU) nr. 524/2013 van het Europees Parlement en de
Raad van 21 mei 2013 betreffende onlinebeslechting van consumentengeschillen en tot
wijziging van Verordening (EG) nr. 2006/2004 en Richtlijn 2009/22/EG (Implementatiewet
buitengerechtelijke geschillenbeslechting consumenten), Stb. 2015, 160.
44 Chapters II, III, IV and V ADR Directive.
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4 QUALITY REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN THE ADR DIRECTIVE
Chapter II of the ADR Directive (arts. 6-11) contains a set of quality require-
ments which ADR entities and ADR procedures must comply with to be
accredited as ADR entities respectively ADR procedures under the Directive.45
The applicability of certain quality principles to both ADR entities and ADR
procedures ismeant to strengthen consumers’ and traders’ confidence in such
entities and procedures.46 A designated ADR entity will be under the super-
vision of a competent authority to ensure that in practice the quality standards
set out in the ADR Directive are met.47 The development of the set of quality
requirements laid down in the Directive took place in a couple of stages.48
For example, certain quality principles of the Directive derive from soft legal
measures taken at Union level in Recommendations 98/257/EC and 2001/310/
EC.49 Bymaking some of these (soft legal) principles (e.g. effectiveness, liberty,
transparency) binding in the ADR Directive, the Directive itself ‘establishes a
set of quality requirements which apply to all ADR procedures carried out by
an ADR entity […]’.50 All ADR entities that wish to be accredited must comply
with the following six quality requirements:
I Expertise, independence and impartiality
To enhance trust in out-of-court redress mechanisms for consumer complaints
a minimum level of procedural safeguards is built into the Directive. Art. 6,
par. 1 of the ADR Directive requires that ‘the natural persons in charge of ADR
possess the necessary expertise and are independent and impartial’. A third
neutral party should thus be competent, which means it should possess the
necessary knowledge and skills in the field of alternative or judicial resolution
of consumer disputes, as well as a general understanding of the law.51 Fur-
thermore the persons in charge of ADR should be independent and impartial:
they should have no conflict of interests and should be appointed for a term
of office of sufficient duration to ensure independence.52
45 Also recital 24 ADR Directive.
46 Recital 37 ADR Directive.
47 Art. 20 par. 2 ADR Directive and recital 55.
48 See for a broader description of these stages: N. Creutzfeldt, ‘How Important is Procedural
Justice for Consumer Dispute Resolution? ACase Study of anOmbudsmanModel for Euro-
pean Consumers’, Journal of Consumer Policy: Volume 37, Issue 4 (2014), p. 532.
49 Recommendation 98/257/EC on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes and Recommendation 2001/310/EC on the
principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of consumer
disputes.
50 Recital 37 ADR Directive.
51 Art. 6 par. 1 (a) ADR Directive, recital 36 ADR Directive.
52 Art. 6 par. 1 (b), (c), (d) ADR Directive, recitals 32, 33, 34, 35.
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II Transparency
To build consumer trust in both ADR and ODR as means of dispute resolution,
ADR schemes and ADR proceduresmust be transparent. In respect thereof art. 7
ADR Directive aims to ensure that information about the ADR entity, its proced-
ures, and other data are easy to obtain by both parties via an up-to-date
website or on a durable medium upon request.53 The information provided
by the ADR entity must be easy to understand in order to give parties the
opportunity to deliberately engage in an ADR procedure.54 Furthermore, ADR
bodies make publicly available on their websites, or by any other means they
consider appropriate, annual activity reports.55 The principle of transparency
laid down in the Directive contains elements of its prior non-binding pre-
decessor expressed in art. II of Recommendation 98/257/EC. It can be seen
as a point of reference to both parties in their quest for information about e.g.
preliminary requirements they have tomeet before initiating an ADR procedure
in front of an ADR entity. The use of the term ‘transparency’ in the light of
the ADR Directive is thus quite broad and obliges ADR entities to disclose
‘practical’ information or formal requirements such as cost of procedures and
languages in which complaints can be submitted.56 Therefore, the definition
of transparency under the ADR Directive should not be confused with the use
of the term in a mere procedural sense, e.g. under art. 6 ECHR (hearings being
open to the public or the result of procedures being published).
III Effectiveness
The quality requirement of effectiveness set out in art. 8 ADRDirective contains
different compartments. First of all the ADR procedure must be available and
easily accessible online and offline to both parties; irrespective of where the
parties are. The online access to the ADR procedure is a precondition for
resolving disputes that arise out of e-commerce transactions (ODR context).
Furthermore effectiveness means: no obligation to retain a lawyer or legal
advisor; the ADR procedure is free of charge or at moderate costs for con-
sumers; and disputes are resolved within a short period of time (within 90
calendar days from the date onwhich the ADR entity has received the complete
complaint file).57
53 Art. 5 par. 2 ADR Directive.
54 Recital 39 ADR Directive.
55 Art. 7 par. 2 ADR Directive.
56 Art. 7 (1)(a),(h) and (l) ADR Directive.
57 In case of highly complex disputes the 90-calendar-day period may be extended by the
ADR entity in charge (art. 8 (e) ADR Directive).
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IV Fairness
According to art. 9 ADR Directive the ADR procedure to resolve a consumer
dispute should be fair, which means that both parties are fully informed about
their rights and the consequences of the decisions they make in the light of
and during an ADR procedure.58 Parties should also be granted the possibility
to express their point of view and be provided by the ADR entity with the
arguments and the evidence of the other party (adversarial process).
V Liberty
The principle of liberty is laid down in art. 10 ADR Directive. The first para-
graph ensures that an agreement between a consumer and a trader to submit
a complaint to an ADR entity is not binding on the consumer if this contractual
agreement was concluded before the dispute arises and the agreement has
the effect of depriving the consumer of his right to bring the dispute before
the courts.59 Paragraph 2 of art. 10 reads as follows: ‘(…) in ADR procedures
which aim at resolving the dispute by imposing a solution, the solution
imposed may be binding on the parties only if they were informed of its
binding nature in advance and specifically accepted this.’
VI Legality
The quality requirement of legality, as set out in art. 11 ADR Directive, entails
in short that in ADR procedures which aim at resolving the dispute by imposing
a solution on the consumer, the solution imposed should not result in the
consumer being deprived of the protection guaranteed by mandatory law of
the Member States where the consumer is habitually resident.60
The ADRDirective is a framework Directive whichmeansminimumharmoniza-
tion is intended by the EU legislator. The quality principles of arts. 6-11 ADR
Directive are thereforeminimum requirements. Recital 38 states that the Direct-
ive ‘should not prevent Member States from adopting or maintaining rules
that go beyond what is provided for in this Directive’. Thus, more stringent
national legislative measures are possible.61 In this respect the Directive does
58 Recital 42 ADR Directive.
59 Recital 43 ADR Directive. Important fact: ‘Agreements to go to arbitration must be carried
out post-dispute’ P. Cortes, A.R. Lodder, ‘Consumer Dispute Resolution goes online:
reflections on the evolution of European law for out-of-court redress’, Maastricht Journal
of European and Comparative Law 2014/1, p. 26.
60 See also recital 44 ADRDirective. Art 11 ADRDirective distinguishes between three different
situations and is thus somewhat difficult to read. See on the corresponding categories in
the Implementation Act Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 3, pp. 21-22.
61 See also art. 2 par. 3 ADR Directive.
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not specify how Member States should implement the quality principles in
their national context. However, art. 20 ADR Directive clarifies that it is the
task of the competent authority (art. 18 ADR Directive) to assess whether the
dispute resolution entities accredited as ADR entity comply with the quality
requirements.62 If they do not, according to art. 20 par. 2 ADR Directive the
competent authority shall ‘contact that dispute resolution entity, stating the
requirements the dispute resolution entity fails to comply with and requesting
it to ensure compliance immediately.’ If the dispute resolution does not fulfil
the requirements after a period of threemonths, the competent authority shall
remove the entity from the list of ADR entities notified to the Commission.
However, sections 6 and 7 of this contribution examine whether the non-
compliance of an ADR entity with the quality standards set out in the ADR
Directive also makes the decision taken by binding advisors (in the Dutch
scenario) unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness
and subject to a possible annulment.
5 IMPLEMENTING THE ADRDIRECTIVE IN THENETHERLANDS: A FRAMEWORK
LAW
As put forward earlier the ADR Directive should have been implemented by
the Member States no later than 9 July 2015.63 The Dutch Implementation
Act (hereafter: ‘Implementation Act’) to transpose the ADR Directive into Dutch
law was published in the Bulletin of Acts and Decrees on 30 April 2015 and
entered into force on 9 July 2015.64 The Dutch government chose to implement
the ADRDirective via a framework law instead of implementing the provisions
of the Directive into different existing laws like the Civil Code, the Code of
Civil Procedure and the Law on the Enforcement of Consumer Protection.65
According to the Dutch government, most of the provisions laid down in the
Implementation Act are of a public-law nature. The ImplementationAct contains
requirements which dispute resolution entities need to comply with in order
to be designated as ADR entities under the Directive. These provisions by their
nature would not fit in with the aforementioned existing laws.66 Furthermore,
the government is of the opinion that framework legislation is the designated
solution for the Netherlands because the scope of the provisions of the ADR
Directive (‘ADR/ODR for consumers’) is broad but not generally applicable.
62 Creutzfeldt 2014, p. 532.
63 Art. 25 ADR Directive.
64 Stb. 2015, 160.
65 Kamerstukken II, 2014/15, 33 982, no. 3, p. 8.
66 Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 982, no. 3, p. 8; Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 4, p. 4;
Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 6, p. 9. The Council of State (‘Raad van State’) was
of a different opinion, see Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 4, pp. 3-4.
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Also, a framework law offers the benefits of accessibility, clarity and coher-
ence.67
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the SGC, Kifid and SKGZ
wished to be accredited as ADR entities under the ADR Directive.68 The status
of accredited ADR entity under the Implementation Act has been granted to
the SGC, Kifid and SKGZ by the designated Dutch competent authorities (the
Minister of Security and Justice (SGC), theMinister of Finance (Kifid and SKGZ)
and the Minister of Public Health, Welfare and Sport (SKGZ)).69
6 ANNULMENT OF A DECISION IN CONNECTION WITH THE MANNER OF ITS
ESTABLISHMENT
As discussed in section 4, the ADR Directive formulates several procedural
requirementswhich ADR procedures governed by theDirective should comply
with.
What is the consequence if these procedural requirements are not met in
a particular ADR procedure? If the ADR procedure was a binding advice pro-
cedure (as will be the case in the Netherlands most of the time), will the
decision taken by binding advisors be subject to annulment on the basis of
art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC in connection with the manner of establishment of the
decision?
The Dutch government does not devote much attention to these possible
private-law consequences of non-compliance with the quality requirements.
As discussed before, the government holds the opinion that the act implement-
ing the ADRDirective is largely of a public-law nature. The consequence of non-
compliance with the procedural requirements is that theMinister will withdraw
the accreditation as an ADR entity under the Directive.70 It is questionable
whether this conclusion is correct. The Dutch government itself does not
entirely preclude a possible effect of the quality requirements set out in the
ADRDirective on the private relationship between the parties. Asked bymem-
bers of parliament what means parties have if they are of the opinion that the
ADR entity did not follow the procedural rules, the government answers that
the decision may be annulled if it would be unacceptable to hold parties to
it according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.71
67 Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 982, no. 3, p. 8.
68 Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 982, no. 3, p. 7 and Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 982, no. 6, pp. 3
and 6.
69 Stcrt. 2015, 45980 (SGC), Stcrt. 2015, 19487 (Kifid), Stcrt. 2015, 19094 and Stcrt. 2015, 19487
(SKGZ). The activities of the SKGZ fall within the scope of both the Ministry of Finance
and theMinistry of Public Health,Welfare and Sport. Hence, the SKGZ has been designated
as an ADR entity by two competent authorities.
70 See art. 17 par. 4-5 of the implementation Act.
71 Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 6, p. 17.
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The conclusion that non-compliance with the quality requirements may
sometimes lead to annulment is not surprising. Under national law, it is clear
that the fact that a binding advisor is subject to instructions from one of the
parties (art. 6 par. 1 (c) of the ADR Directive) or the fact that the parties did
not have the possibility of expressing their point of view (art. 9 par 1 (a) of
the ADR Directive), may be a reason to conclude that it is unreasonable to hold
a party to the decision according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.72
In this respect, the inclusion of these procedural requirements in the ADR
Directive adds nothing new. A much more interesting question is whether
the ADRDirective implies that non-compliancewith these requirements should
make the decision non-binding on the parties. Although the Directive sees
the procedural requirements as preconditions for the qualification as an ADR
entity (see art. 20 par. 1-2 of the ADR Directive), it is not unthinkable that the
ADR Directive requires more. The ADR Directive provides that Member States
shall ‘ensure’ that the procedural requirements are met.73 According to the
case law of the European Court of Justice the obligation of Member States to
implement a directive involves the adoption of all the measures necessary to
ensure that the directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective
which it pursues.74 Have Member States done enough to ‘ensure’ the observ-
ance of the quality requirements of the ADR Directive, if their only sanction
in case of non-compliance is the withdrawal of the accreditation as an ADR
entity under the Directive?
This withdrawal does not in all cases seem a very effective means of
enforcement. It will not be easy for the competent authorities to assesswhether
the ADR entities comply with the quality requirements. It will for example be
difficult to determine whether an ADR entity in practice always gives parties
the possibility to comment on the arguments, evidence, documents and facts
put forward by the other party (see art. 9 par. 1 (a) of the ADR Directive). In
this respect it is interesting to note that the provision implementing art. 9 par. 1
(a) only requires ADR entities to make sure that their procedural rules provide
for the possibility of parties to comment on each other’s arguments et cetera.
The wording of art. 9 par. 1 (a) of the ADR Directive suggests that parties
should in practice be able to comment on each other’s arguments. This point
aside, even if a competent authority succeeds in showing that an ADR entity
does not comply with one of the quality requirements, the sanction – with-
drawal of the accreditation as an ADR entity – seems rather severe, certainly
whenminor deficiencies are concerned. Since ADR entities will first be notified
72 See for example Dutch Supreme Court 30 October 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BK1548, JBPr
2010/16 note P.E. Ernste; Dutch Supreme Court 20May 2005,NJ 2007/114, note H.J. Snijders
under NJ 2007/115 (Gem. Amsterdam/Honnebier).
73 See for example art. 6, art. 5 par. 2 and 5 and art. 7- 9 ADR Directive.
74 See ECJ 17 June 1999, C-336/97 (Commission/Italy), par. 19; ECJ 8 March 2001, C-97/00
(Commission/France), par. 9; ECJ 5 December 2002, C-324/01 (Commission/Belgium), par. 18.
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and given a period of threemonths to fulfil the requirements (see art. 20 par. 2
of the ADR Directive and art. 17 par. 4 of the Implementation Act), it is ques-
tionable whether it will ever be imposed. Other, more subtle, enforcement
mechanisms thus do seem desirable.
For some of the procedural requirements, it does not seem problematic
if the ADR Directive implied that non-compliance makes the decision subject
to annulment. One could for example argue that the fact that a binding advisor
is remunerated in a way that is linked to the outcome of the procedure (art. 6
par. 1 (d) of the ADR Directive), constitutes such a grave deficiency in the
procedure that the decision should be non-binding on the parties in all circum-
stances. The same can be said of the fact that the ADR entity did not provide
the parties with the arguments, evidence, documents or facts put forward by
the other party (art. 9 par. 1 (a) of the ADR Directive). The courts would thus
need to deviate from the case law that even in case of breach of the principle
of audi alteram partem, one of the factors that should be considered in assessing
whether the decision should be set aside is whether and if so, to what extent,
this fault has disadvantaged the other party (the ‘disadvantage criterion’).
For other quality requirements included in the ADR Directive, it seemsmore
problematic to conclude that the mere breachwouldmake the decision subject
to annulment. Should the mere fact that a binding advisor was appointed for
too short a term of office (art. 6 (d) of the ADRDirective), make all the decisions
that he has taken during his appointment subject to annulment? Does the fact
that parties were obliged by the ADR entity to retain a lawyermake it unaccept-
able for a party to be held to the decision taken by that entity (see art. 8 par.
1 (b) of the ADR Directive)? May a decision be annulled purely because a party
shows that the ADR entity did not make publicly available on a website infor-
mation on the natural persons in charge of ADR (art. 7 par. 1 (a) of the ADR
Directive)? Problematic in these examples is that it is difficult to see in what
way a party is affected by the deficiency. In what way is a party affected by
the circumstance that a binding advisor was appointed for too short a term
of office? Although the requirements mentioned are important to guarantee
the quality of ADR procedures in general, it is more problematic to make the
connectionwith the quality of a specific procedure. In these examples, it seems
important for the other party to be able to invoke the fact that the party was
not disadvantaged by the procedural fault.
However, if the ‘disadvantage criterion’ can still be relied on, there seems
to be no effective remedy for the parties against breach of one of these require-
ments. It will be very difficult to show that a party has been disadvantaged
by the fact that a binding advisor was appointed for too short a term of office
or by the fact that the ADR entity did not make publicly available on a website
information on the natural persons in charge of ADR. This conclusion is not
much altered by the fact that it is likely that disadvantage should be presumed
and that it is for the other party to show that the party was not disadvantaged
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by a deficiency.75 If a party provides no indication at all in what way it was
disadvantaged, the other party may easily bear this burden.
Art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC does not seem to provide a very effective means to
enforce the procedural requirements included in the ADR Directive when the
‘disadvantage criterion’ can still be relied on. Should the conclusion thus be
that the ADR Directive implies that the ‘disadvantage criterion’ can no longer
be applied when cases covered by the ADR Directive are concerned? Let’s hope
not. In our opinion this criterion is necessary to select those cases in which
annulment is appropriate. To abandon the criterionwouldmean that decisions
can be set aside too easily. This would, for example, make all the decisions
of a binding advisor who, as it turns out, does not possess a ‘general under-
standing of law’ (6 par. 1 (a) of the ADR Directive), subject to annulment, even
if this particular binding advisor is part of a collegial body and othermembers
havemore than enough knowledge to compensate for his deficiency. If parties
could so easily challenge the validity of decisions taken in binding advice,
the aim of providing them with a ‘simple, efficient, fast and low-cost way’
of resolving disputes will not be achieved.76 The risk of having to follow a
court procedure after the completion of the ADR track, will become very high.
This risk may be especially high for the consumer. Since compliance with the
procedural requirements is in the interest of both parties to the ADR procedure,
not only the consumer, but also the trader has the possibility to invoke the
fact one of these requirementswas breached. It may be expected that the trader
will make use of this possibility more often than the consumer, since the
threshold of going to court will in many cases be lower for the trader. It is
therefore likely that the consumer will more often be dragged into a court
procedure after completing an ADR procedure which ended favourably for
him than the trader. In our opinion, the ‘disadvantage criterion’ is therefore
necessary to select those cases in which annulment is appropriate. However,
we shall have to await the case law of the European Court of Justice on the
ADR Directive to know for certain whether this criterion can still be relied on.
In conclusion, in our opinion breach of one of the quality requirements
included in the ADRDirective should not automaticallymake the decision taken
in a binding advice procedure subject to annulment. That does not mean that
non-compliance with the quality requirements included in the ADR Directive
is of no significance in the setting of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. The breach of these
requirements is an important argument that it is unacceptable according to
standards of reasonableness and fairness to hold a party to the decision in
connection with the manner of its establishment. Therefore, the courts may
sometimes come to a quicker annulment of the decision by binding advisors
75 Snijders in his note for Dutch Supreme Court 20 May 2005, NJ 2007/114 (Gem. Amsterdam/
Honnebier) and Dutch Supreme Court 24 March 2006, NJ 2007/115 (Meurs/Newomij), no.
2e; Ernste 2012, pp. 74-75; Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 163.
76 Recital 4 ADR Directive.
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than in the situation before implementation of the ADRDirective. For example,
the mere fact that one of the parties was not provided by the ADR entity with
the arguments, evidence, documents or facts put forward by the other party
(art. 9 par. 1 (a) of the ADR Directive), may be sufficient reason to conclude
that the decision should be annulled on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC.
The fact that one of the procedural requirements included in the ADR
Directive was breached might even be used as an argument when ADR pro-
cedures not covered by the Directive are concerned. Since the quality require-
ments mentioned in the ADR Directive are of a general nature, it is not excluded
that they have an indirect effect in such cases. An indirect effect seems certainly
likely in the situation in which a trader starts an ADR procedure against a
consumer. Since such a procedure falls outside the scope of the ADR Directive
and of the Implementation Act, the procedural requirements do not apply.
However, it is not clear what can justify this lower level of protection offered
to the consumer. It is thus quite defendable that in this situation, the fact that
a procedural requirement mentioned in the ADR Directive was breached can
be used as an argument that it is unacceptable according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness to hold a party to the decision.
The procedural requirements of the ADRDirective and the law implement-
ing them thus do influence the concept of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ in art.
7:904 par. 1 DCC. In ADR procedures covered by the ADR Directive, the mere
fact that one of the procedural requirements is breached should not automatic-
ally make the decision of binding advisors subject to annulment on the basis
of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. However, the non-compliance with these requirements
is a very serious indication that it is unacceptable according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness to hold a party to the decision in connection with
the manner of its establishment. Outside the scope of application of the ADR
Directive, the procedural requirements may have an indirect effect.
7 ANNULMENT OF A DECISION IN CONNECTION WITH ITS CONTENT
As was seen in the previous section, the procedural requirements mentioned
in the ADR Directive may influence the standard for annulment of a decision
in relation with its manner of establishment. Does the ADR Directive have an
influence on the possibility of annulment of a decision in connection with its
content as well?
As was pointed out before, art. 11 of the ADR Directive requires Member
States to ensure that in ADR procedures which aim at resolving the dispute
by imposing a solution on the consumer, the solution imposed shall not result
in the consumer being deprived of the protection afforded to him by the
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mandatory law of the Member State where the consumer is habitually res-
ident.77 This provision is implemented in Dutch law by means of art. 10 of
the Implementation Act. Art. 10 par. 1 of the Implementation Act tries to
ensure that the protection of mandatory law is afforded to the consumer by
simply stating that the solution imposed on the consumer shall not deprive
him of it. What are the consequences in the event a decision is taken that does
deprive the consumer of the protection afforded to him by mandatory law?
What happens, for example, when binding advisors have refused to annul
a term in the general terms and conditions of the trader in a case where the
trader gave these terms and conditions to the consumer after the time of entry
into the contract (this in contradiction with art. 6:233(b) and 6:234 DCC)?
Although the Implementation Act is not entirely clear on this point, the non-
compliance with this quality requirement is probably a reason to withdraw
from the entity that has taken the decision the accreditation as an ADR entity
under the Directive (see art. 20 par. 2 of the ADR Directive and art. 17 par. 4
of the Implementation Act). However, it follows from art. 10 par. 2 of the
Implementation Act that the non-compliance has consequences for the parties
as well. This provision states that art. 7:902 DCC does not apply to ADR pro-
cedures governed by the Directive.78
As was seen in paragraph 2, it is not possible to annul a decision on the
basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC on the sole ground that it is in breach of
mandatory law. The reason is that art. 7:902 DCC makes it clear that a decision
to terminate an uncertainty or dispute in the field of the law of property,
proprietary rights and interests is valid, notwithstanding that it proves to be
in breach of mandatory law, unless it would also, as to content or necessary
implication, be in breach of good morals and public policy.79 Art. 10 par. 2
of the Implementation Act abolishes art. 7:902 DCC when ADR procedures
covered by the Directive are concerned. A decision in breach of mandatory
law will in those cases no longer be valid.
One could wonder whether the abolishment of art. 7:902 DCC was really
necessary. First of all, it is questionable whether the Directive requires that
breach of mandatory law has consequences for the validity of the decision
taken by the ADR entity. It might be sufficient for a Member State to withdraw
the accreditation as an ADR entity when this entity imposes solutions on
consumers which are not in accordance with mandatory law. However, this
method of enforcement appears to be rather ineffective. It will be very difficult
for a competent authority within a Member State to verify whether the de-
77 See section 4.
78 ‘Op procedures tot buitengerechtelijke geschilbeslechting die beslecht worden door een
vaststelling als bedoeld in artikel 7:900 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek is artikel 7:902 van het
Burgerlijk Wetboek niet van toepassing.’
79 Asser/Van Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 163; see Dutch Supreme Court 12 September 1997,
NJ 1998/382, note M.M. Mendel (Confood/Zürich) and the opinion of Advocate General
Bakels, no. 3.26-3.29.
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cisions of an ADR entity are in accordance with mandatory law. Art. 20 par. 1
ADR Directive provides that a competent authority makes the assessment
whether an entity complies with the quality requirements in particular on the
basis of information it has received from the ADR entity itself in accordance
with art. 19 ADR Directive. Art. 19 ADR contains a list of information that ADR
entities need to notify to the competent authority, but information on the
content of the decisions taken by the ADR entity is missing from this list. Since
the ADR Directive requires minimum harmonization, the Dutch legislator can
impose farther-reaching duties on ADR entities to provide information, but
the legislator did not make use of this possibility (see art. 17 par. 1 and 18
Implementation Act). The competent authorities within the Netherlands will
therefore not have the data necessary to verify effectively whether the decisions
of an ADR entity are in accordance with mandatory law. Therefore, additional
measures to ensure that the ADR entities apply the mandatory law correctly
seem necessary.
One could also wonder whether decisions in breach of mandatory provi-
sions for the protection of the consumer were not already invalid without the
abolition of art. 7:902 DCC. It could be argued that such mandatory provisions
for the protection of the consumer can be seen as rules of public policy which
fall under the exception of art. 7:902 DCC.80 However, although somemandat-
ory rules for the protection of the consumer may indeed be qualified as rules
of public policy, it is not likely that this is true for all the provisions covered
by art. 11 ADR Directive. Art. 11 ADR Directive uses the words ‘provisions that
cannot be derogated from by agreement’ (par. 1 (a) and (b)) and ‘mandatory
rules’ (par. 1 (c)), by which reference is made to the Rome I Regulation respect-
ively the Rome Convention.81 As regards the Rome I Regulation, it is assumed
that the words ‘provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement’ in
art. 6 par. 2 do not only cover rules that specifically aim to protect the con-
sumer, but also more general private-law rules that may have the effect of
offering protection to the consumer.82 These words should be distinguished
from the concept of ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ mentioned in art. 8
of the Rome I Regulation, which should be construed more restrictively.83
It therefore does not seem likely that all the ‘provisions that cannot be de-
80 Case law of the European Court of Justice may support this view; see ECJ 6 October 2009,
C-40/08, NJ 2010/11, note M.R. Mok (Asturcom/Rodríguez Noguiera), par. 52-53, 59; ECJ 16
November 2010, C-76/10 (Pohotovost’/Korèkovská), par. 50-54. ECJ 1 June 1999, C-126/97,
NJ 2000/339 (Eco Swiss/Benetton), par. 36-37.
81 See also Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 982, no. 3, pp. 21-22.
82 M. McParland, The Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2015, no. 12.185, p. 551; F. Ragno, ‘The LawApplicable to Consumer
Contracts under the Rome I Regulation’, in: F. Ferrari & S. Leible (eds.), Rome I Regulation.
The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe, München: Sellier 2009, p. 152.
83 See recital 37 of the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I). See also
McParland 2015, no. 12.185. p. 551.
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rogated from by agreement’ in the sense of art. 11 ADR Directive can be qual-
ified as rules of public policy. In order to make sure that the consumer is not
bound by a decision in breach of mandatory law, the legislator could therefore
not leave art. 7:902 DCC unamended.
As a consequence of the abolition of art. 7:902 DCC, decisions in breach
of mandatory law taken in a procedure covered by the Implementation Act
are no longer valid on the basis of art. 7:902 DCC. But if they are no longer
valid, what regime does apply to them? Are the decisions null and void? Are
they subject to annulment? The parliamentary papers accompanying the
Implementation Act do not offer clarity. They only state that with the abolition
of art. 7:902 DCC in these situations, there is no longer any room for departure
from mandatory law.84 Various theories may be developed. First of all, a
decision in breach of mandatory law may simply be null and void. Legal
literature points in this direction, since the same is assumed in other situations
falling outside the scope of art. 7:902 DCC. For example, decisions in breach
of mandatory law in disputes outside the field of the law of property, pro-
prietary rights and interests (such as disputes in the field of family law) are
seen as null and void. This would follow a contrario from art. 7:902 DCC.85
The downside of a solution in which the decision is simply null and void, is
that it also makes it possible for the trader to invoke the invalidity of the
decision. Art. 11 ADRDirective, by contrast, seemswritten solely for the benefit
of the consumer.
From the explanatory memorandum accompanying the preliminary draft
of the Dutch Civil Code, another view may be deducted. Here it is stated that
the normal rules apply to cases falling outside the scope of art. 7:902 DCC.86
The question is obviously what these ‘normal’ rules are. Possibly, reference
is made to art. 3:40 DCC, which offers a general arrangement for acts in breach
of statutory provisions. Paragraph 3:40 par. 2 DCC states that a juridical act
which violates a mandatory statutory provision becomes null and void; if,
however, the provision is intended solely for the protection of one of the
parties to a multilateral juridical act, the act may only be annulled; in both
cases this applies to the extent that the provision does not otherwise provide.87
Art. 3:40 par. 2 DCC thus makes it possible to take into account which party
the mandatory law intends to protect. Therefore, the trader may not be able
to invoke the invalidity of the decision because mandatory law protecting the
84 Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 33 982, no. 3, p. 22.
85 According to Van Schaick, no obligations arise for the parties from the binding advice
agreement in such circumstances. He does not make it clear why this is so. See Asser/Van
Schaick 2012 (7-VIII*), no. 153, no. 156. According to Ernste, if a decision is not only in
breach of mandatory law, but also in breach of goodmorals and public policy, the decision
is null and void. In her opinion, this follows a contrario from art. 7:902 DCC.
86 Toelichting Meijers, Vierde gedeelte, Boek 7, p. 1141.
87 See on art. 3:40 DCC A.S. Hartkamp, M.M.M. Tillema & A.E.B. ter Heide, Contract Law in
the Netherlands, Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2011, nos. 93-95, pp. 87-89.
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consumer was breached. It is problematic, however, that art. 3:40 par. 2 DCC
offers the possibility to take the purpose of the mandatory provision into
account only in case of a multilateral juridical act. The decision by binding
advisors is seen as a unilateral juridical act.88A literal interpretation of art. 3:40
par. 2 DCC would therefore mean that the decision in breach of mandatory
law is simply null and void; the second sentence of art. 3:40 par. 2 DCC does
not apply. Although a different interpretation of art. 3:40 par. 2 DCC is certainly
defendable, the above shows that application of this provision is not entirely
unproblematic in the specific situation of binding advice, in which the parties
are bound by a juridical act performed by another party (the binding
advisor(s)).
A last possibility is to assess decisions in breach of mandatory law on the
basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. It could be argued that with the abolition of art.
7:902 DCC, the mere fact that mandatory lawwas breached is sufficient reason
for annulment of the decision. The non-compliance withmandatory lawmakes
it unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness for a
party to be held to the decision in connection with its content. The advantage
of this solution is that art. 7:904 DCC offers an arrangement specifically adapted
to binding advice. The validity of decisions taken in binding advice will be
covered exclusively by art. 7:904 DCC. Another advantage is that art. 7:904 par.
1 DCC makes the decision subject to annulment. One could therefore argue
that only the consumermay invoke the invalidity of the decision if mandatory
law protecting the consumer was breached. The trader would not be able to
annul the decision in such circumstances.
In our opinion, this last option is preferable. Since art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC
specifically deals with the situation of binding advice, this provision can be
seen as a lex specialis to art. 3:40 par. 2 DCC. Even in this solution, the abolition
of art. 7:902 DCC for ADR procedures covered by the Directive has far-reaching
consequences. First of all, it means that it will be difficult for the SGC to use
‘reasonableness and fairness’ as a standard for deciding their cases instead
of the rules of law, since the Complaints Boards will at least need to apply
mandatory law. But even if an ADR entity uses the rules of law as a standard,
its decisions are in danger of being subject to annulment. A decision by an
ADR entitymay easily be in breach ofmandatory law. Large areas of consumer
law are of a mandatory nature. Many disputes submitted to ADR will thus
require the application of mandatory rules. Since these rules are not always
clear, an ADR entity may easily give an incorrect interpretation of such a
provision. Even if the ADR entity (as it later turns out) interprets the provision
in the correct way, a party may be of a different opinion and contest this
interpretation in court. The validity of many decisions taken in ADR is thus
up for discussion. In this respect it is interesting to note that the explanatory
88 Ernste 2012, pp. 59-60.
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memorandum accompanying the preliminary draft of the Dutch Civil Code
makes it clear that since decisions in a dispute not pertaining to the field of
the law of property, proprietary rights and interests, can be examined
unrestrictedly for compatibility with mandatory law, it will make little sense
to submit such a dispute to binding advice.89 Art. 10 par. 2 of the Implementa-
tion Act in connection with art. 11 of the ADR Directive thus seems to take
away a great deal of the binding force of a decision taken in a binding advice
procedure covered by the Directive. This would be the case even more so if
not only the consumer, but also the trader could invoke the invalidity of a
decision in breach of mandatory law protecting the consumer. A solution in
which only the consumer can in those circumstances invoke this ground is
preferable.
A disadvantage of the fact that art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC makes the decision
subject to annulment may be that the consumer would actively need to annul
the decision taken by binding advisors. If he does not, he remains bound by
it.90 It is questionable whether the law thus complies with art. 11 ADR Direct-
ive. If the consumer does not actively annul the decision, he will be deprived
of the protection afforded to him by mandatory law. An interpretation in the
light of the ADR Directive might lead to the conclusion that the court may annul
the decision of its own motion in such cases.91
It is important to note that art. 10 par. 2 of the Implementation Act is not
confined to mandatory law protecting the consumer, but abolishes art. 7:902
DCC altogether. If mandatory law that – in the particular circumstances of the
case – protects the interests of the trader is breached, this will thus have
consequences for the validity of the decision as well. By contrast, art. 11 of
the ADR Directive is confined to mandatory law protecting the consumer. The
binding force of decisions taken in binding advice is thus reduced further by
the Implementation Act than was strictly necessary under the ADR Directive.
As was observed before, it seems likely that the trader will more often make
use of the possibility to set aside a decision unfavourable to him in court than
the consumer.
Added to this is the fact that art. 11 of the ADR Directive and art. 10 par. 1
of the Implementation Act do not seem to be confined to the breach of mandat-
ory law. They state that the solution imposed ‘shall not result in the consumer
being deprived of the protection afforded to him’ bymandatory law. If binding
advisors establish the facts in another way than a regular court would have
done, this obviously can have consequences for the application of mandatory
law. The difference in the established facts may for example result in the ADR
89 Toelichting Meijers, Vierde gedeelte, Boek 7, p. 1141.
90 Hartkamp, Tillema & Ter Heide 2011, no. 100, pp. 92-93; Chorus, Gerver & Hondius 2006,
p. 154.
91 Cf. Dutch Supreme Court 13 September 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:691, NJ 2014/274, note
H.B. Krans (Heesakkers/Voets), par. 3.7.1-3.7.3.
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entity concluding that a certain mandatory rule is not applicable, where a
regular court would have applied that rule. In this situation, one could say
that the consumerwas ‘deprived of the protection afforded to him’ bymandat-
ory law. Do art. 11 of the Directive and art. 10 of the Implementation Act thus
imply that the decision should not be valid in such a situation? If this con-
clusion is correct, it would offer parties the opportunity to challenge the
establishment of the facts by binding advisors at the regular court. The proced-
ure on the validity of the decision at the regular courts will thus come very
close to a full appeal.
Another point is worth mentioning in connection with art. 10 par. 2 of the
Implementation Act. It is interesting to see that this provision only abolishes
art. 7:902 DCC in binding advice procedures governed by the ADR Directive.92
This choice implies that the decision taken in a procedure started by the
consumer against a trader can be scrutinized for compatibility with mandatory
law, whereas a decision taken in a procedure started by the trader against a
consumer, cannot. In this latter situation, art. 7:902 DCC still applies and the
decision is valid notwithstanding the fact that it is in breach of mandatory
law protecting the consumer. This difference in the way the interests of the
consumer are protected, depending onwhich party started the ADR procedure,
is difficult to defend. In some instances, this difference might be avoided by
the fact that the provision protecting the consumer can be seen as a rule of
public policy, so that the exception of art. 7:902 DCC applies. In other instances,
it might be possible to find a solution by making use of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC.
The fact that the decision was in breach of mandatory law protecting the
consumer may be reason to conclude that it is unacceptable according to
standards of reasonableness and fairness for the consumer to be held to the
decision in connection with its content. In order to come to this conclusion,
the courts would need to deviate from the case law that it is not possible to
annul a decision on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC on the sole ground that
the decision is in breach of mandatory law. This deviation might be justified
by thewish to avoid a different treatment of the consumer depending onwhich
party started the ADR procedure. Whether courts are willing to take this
approach remains to be seen. This approach would mean that art. 7:902 DCC
is de facto of little meaning in those cases.
As has become clear in this section, art. 11 of the ADRDirective in combina-
tion with art. 10 of the Implementation Act has an influence on the binding
force of decisions taken in binding advice. Here again, it is questionable
whether the extensive powers of the court to scrutinize the decisions by
binding advisors are desirable. Parties turn to ADR to put an end to their
conflict. If decisions taken in binding advice can be challenged too easily, all
that parties achieve by turning to ADR may be adding an extra stage to their
92 See art. 2 of the Implementation Act.
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proceedings. If the risk of having to follow a court procedure after the comple-
tion of the ADR procedure becomes too high, parties will turn away from ADR.
This raises the question whether there are alternative ways in which the
compatibility with mandatory law of decisions taken in binding advice can
be enhanced.
8 SAFEGUARDS TO ENHANCE COMPATIBILITY WITH MANDATORY LAW UNDER
ART. 11 ADR DIRECTIVE
To enhance compatibility with mandatory law of decisions taken in binding
advice, certain safeguards on both the national and the European level could
be introduced. In this section two possible national safeguards and a European
one will be touched upon.93
Asmentioned in section 4, the ADR Directive is a framework Directive that
allows Member States to introduce rules that go beyond those laid down by
the Directive.94 The Dutch legislator was given some policy latitude to decide
whether the national ADR entities that use binding advice as an ADR procedure
should comply with an extra information duty that goes a little beyond the
list of requirements as set out in art. 19 par. 3 ADR Directive, laid down in art.
18 Implementation Act. One could add to art. 18 Implementation Act an extra
duty for ADR entities to communicate data to the competent authority on cases
where mandatory law has been applied in the dispute resolution process. Via
the construction of a specific IT application, which e.g. recognizes provisions
of mandatory law in the documents it screens, it should be possible for Dutch
ADR entities to build a database of decisions taken in binding advice where
mandatory law has been applied. The content of this database should be sent
to the competent authority every two years.95 However, this safeguard could
result in extra costs in the sense that this IT application should be developed
(by either the government or the ADR entities themselves) and integrated into
the workflow systems of the appointed Dutch ADR entities. Furthermore, this
extra information duty could increase the workload of the secretariat of the
competent authority96 as it should test if the mandatory law has been applied
properly in the decisions given by binding advice. The Dutch legislator did
not use the policy latitude given by the European legislator to include a more
93 Amore in-depth analysis of the illustrated safeguards is subject to further studies and goes
beyond the scope of this contribution.
94 Art. 2 par. 3 ADR Directive.
95 Every two years the ADR entities are obliged to send information to the competent author-
ity. See art. 19 par. 3 ADR Directive, art. 18 Implementation Act.
96 Art. 18 ADR Directive, art. 1, par. 1(i) in conjunction with art. 16 Implementation Act.
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stringent information duty in art. 18 of the Implementation Act. However,
this might be a future option when the ADR Directive is evaluated.97
Which leads to the illustration of a different national safeguard. Since 2012
it has been possible to address a prejudicial question to the Supreme Court
at (one of the) parties’ request or ex officio by the judge of first instance via
articles 392-394 Code of Civil Procedure. The prejudicial question addressed
to the Supreme Court could be a valuable option to checkwhethermandatory
law is applied correctly in decisions taken in binding advice. Grounds for
addressing a prejudicial question are a multiplicity of claims based on similar
facts and/or questions of law.98 Both are not unlikely to occur in consumer
cases.99 For the realization of this safeguard binding advisors should be
granted the possibility to address a prejudicial question to the Supreme Court
about how to apply mandatory law correctly.100 This new competence of
binding advisors could be a liaison between ADR and the courts, which might
be an argument for the Supreme Court to allow the aforementioned questions
addressed as an alternate safeguard.101 This option too has a downside
though, since addressing a prejudicial question would put the binding advice
procedure on hold and the binding advisors therefore might struggle to reach
a decision within the period of 90 calendar days from the date on which the
ADR entity has received the complete complaint file (art. 8(e) ADR Directive).
Further research on the feasibility of this safeguard is therefore necessary.
Last but not least, a safeguard at European level might be an option. Art.
16 ADRDirective emphasizes thatMember States shall ensure that ADR entities
cooperate and exchange best practices with regard to the settlement of disputes.
In line with this European push to cooperate would be the establishment of
a European judicial committee that monitors a selection of ADR decisions on
legality and gives advice to ADR entities on how mandatory law could be
applied best in the various European CDR models.
97 By 9 July 2019, and every four years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee a report
on the application of the ADR Directive, art. 26 ADR Directive.
98 Art. 392 par. 1(a), (b) Code of Civil Procedure.
99 See recital 30 ADR Directive and art. 19 par. 3 (e) ADR Directive.
100 Arbitrators are not permitted to address a prejudicial question to the Court of Justice of
the European Union (See ECJ 23 March 1982, C-102/81, NJ 1983/149 (Nordsee)). The route
to address a prejudicial question to the Supreme Court is therefore likely not to be open
to binding advisors either.
101 The relation between the prejudicial question addressed to the Supreme Court and ADR
is not clarified in literature and practice and thus the feasibility of this default option is
subject to further studies.
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9 CONCLUSION
In this contribution, we addressed the question whether the ADR Directive
influences the interpretation of the core concept of ‘reasonableness and fairness’
within the context of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. If a binding advice procedure does
not comply with the quality requirements set out in the Directive, does this
make it ‘unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness’
for a party to be held to the decision taken by binding advisors? Can the
decision therefore be annulled in such a case? It was argued that the ADR
Directive to a certain extent does influence the interpretation of this concept.
When the manner of establishment of the decision is concerned, the fact
that one of the procedural requirements of the ADR Directive was breached
forms a very serious indication that it is unacceptable according to standards
of reasonableness and fairness to hold a party to the decision. However, this
contribution argued that the breach of one of these requirements should not
automatically make the decision subject to annulment. If a party was not
disadvantaged by the deficiency, the decision may, depending on the circum-
stances, be upheld. It would be undesirable if the ADR Directive implied
otherwise. In binding advice procedures falling outside the scope of application
of the ADRDirective, the procedural requirementsmay have an indirect effect,
in the sense that the fact that one of the procedural requirements mentioned
in the ADR Directive was breached, can be used as an argument that the
decision should be annulled. Such an argument seems especially strong in
cases in which a trader started an ADR procedure against a consumer.
With regard to the content of the decision it is clear that the ADR Directive
(and the Implementation Act) has an influence on the standard of art. 7:904
par. 1 DCC, although it is not entirely certain in what way. Art. 10 par. 2
Implementation Act abolishes art. 7:902 DCC for ADR procedures covered by
the ADR Directive, so that decisions in breach of mandatory law are no longer
valid on the basis of this provision. However, it is not clear what regime does
apply to them. This contribution argues that decisions in breach ofmandatory
law are subject to annulment on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC. If a manda-
tory provision protecting the consumer is breached, it will be unacceptable
for the consumer to be held to the decision according to standards of reason-
ableness and fairness. In this view, the trader will not be able to invoke the
fact that a mandatory provision protecting the consumer was not applied.
However, even in this view art. 10 par. 2 of the Implementation Act has far-
reaching consequences. Consumer law is to a large extent mandatory by nature.
A decision may easily entail a wrong interpretation of mandatory law and
thus be subject to annulment. In cases in which a trader starts an ADR pro-
cedure against a consumer (and in which the ADR Directive thus does not
apply), art. 7:902 DCC remains unaltered. However, the desire to afford the
consumer the same protection in those cases as is given to him in situations
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in which he himself turns to ADR may bring the court to a quicker annulment
of the decision on the basis of art. 7:904 par. 1 DCC as well.
The ADRDirective in combinationwith the Implementation Act does seem
to take away a great deal of the binding force of decisions taken in a binding
advice procedure covered by the Directive. Since the ADR Directive opens such
extensive possibilities for parties to challenge the decisions imposed on them,
the risk of having to follow a court procedure after the completion of the ADR
track will become high. Thus, the aim of the ADR Directive of providing parties
with a ‘simple, efficient, fast and low-cost way’ of resolving disputes might
not be achieved. Therefore, this contribution has examined alternative ways
in which the quality of consumer ADR can be enhanced. Two national safe-
guards and a European one have been touched upon. In the Dutch CDR system
one could think of a future extra information duty for ADR entities with regard
to the legality requirement in art. 18 of the Implementation Act. Furthermore,
binding advisors might be granted the opportunity to address a prejudicial
question to the Supreme Court. Finally, at the European level a European
judicial committee thatmonitors a selection of ADR decisions on legalitymight
enhance compatibility with mandatory law in binding decisions throughout
Europe.

